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PREFACE
This manual summarizes reliability experience from both NASA and industry, and is
intended to reflect engineering principles to support current and future civil space
programs.
Reliability must be an integral part of the systems engineering process. Although both
disciplines must be weighed equally with other technical and programmatic demands, the
application of sound reliability principles will be the key to the effectiveness and
affordability of America's space program. Experience with our space programs has
shown that reliability efforts must focus on the design characteristics that affect
frequency of failure. This manual emphasizes that these identified design characteristics
must be controlled through the application of conservative engineering principles.
I strongly encourage the use of this manual to assess your current reliability techniques.
The manual should promote an active technical interchange between reliability and
design engineering that focuses on the design margins, and their potential impact on
maintenance and logistics requirements. By applying these practices and guidelines,
reliability organizations throughout NASA and the aerospace community, will continue to
contribute to a systems development process that assures that:
Operating environments are well defined and independently verified.
Design criteria drive a conservative design approach.
Design weaknesses evident by test or analysis are identified and tracked.
I intend that this manual should be a dynamic medium for technical communication.
Additional practices and guidelines will be published periodically. This manual should
be considered a series of technical memoranda for promoting a systematic approach to
the reliability discipline. Selective use of these practices and guidelines provides the
engineering community with the necessary tools to assure the highest possible degree of
success in the Nation's civil space program.
George A. Rodney
Associate Administrator for
Safety and Mission Quality
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I. OVERVIEW
A. PURPOSE
This manual is produced to communicate within the aerospace community design
practices that have contributed to NASA mission success. The information presented has
been collected from various NASA field centers and reviewed by a committee consisting
of senior technical representatives from the participating centers.
B. APPLICABILITY
The information presented in this manual represents the "best technical advice" that
NASA has to offer on reliability design and test practices. The practices contained in
this manual should not be interpreted as requirements but rather as proven technical
approaches that can enhance system reliability. Application of the practices and
guidelines is strongly encouraged, but the final decisions regarding applicability resides
with the particular program or project office.
The manual is divided into two technical sections. Section II contains reliability
practices, including design criteria, test procedures, or analytical techniques that have
been successfully applied on previous space flight programs. Section III contains
reliability guidelines, including techniques currently applied to space flight projects,
where insufficient information exists to certify that the technique will contribute to
mission success.
C. DISCUSSION
Experience with NASA's successful extended duration space missions shows that four
fundamental elements contribute to high reliability: 1) understanding stress factors
imposed on flight hardware by its operating environment; 2) controlling the stress
factors through selection of conservative design criteria; 3) appropriate analysis to
identify and track high stress points in the design (prior to qualification testing or flight
use); and 4) careful selection of redundancy alternatives that will provide the necessary
function(s) should failure occur.
This manual is provided to encourage design, test, and reliability engineers to give
careful attention to both redundancy and stress management during the design and
development of space flight systems.
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D. CONTROL/CONTRIBUTIONS
The practices and guidelines contained in this manual serve as a mechanism for
communicating the latest techniques that contribute to high reliability. This publication
will be revised periodically to include additional practices/guidelines, or revisions to
information (as additional technical data become available). Contributions from
aerospace contractors and NASA field centers is encouraged. Any practice, guideline, or
technique that appears appropriate for inclusion in this manual should be submitted for
review. Submissions should be formatted identically to the practices and guidelines in
this manual and sent to the address below for consideration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Code QR
600 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20546
Organizations submitting practices/guidelines that are selected for inclusion in this
manual will be recognized in the lower right-hand corner of the published item.
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II. RELIABILITY PRACTICES
A. INTRODUCTION
This section contains Reliability Design Practices that have contributed to the success of
previous space flight programs. The information presented in this section is for use
throughout NASA and the aerospace community to assist in the design and development
of highly reliable equipment and assemblies. The practices include recommended
analysis procedures, redundancy considerations, parts selection, environmental
requirements considerations, and test requirements and procedures.
B. RELIABILITY DESIGN PRACTICE FORMAT DEFINITIONS
The format for the reliability practices is shown in Figure 1.
PRACTICE FORMAT DEFINITIONS
_: A brief statement of the practice.
Benefit: A concise statement of the technical improvement realized from implementing the
practice.
Prom'ams That Certified Usage: Identifiable programs or projects that have applied the
practice.
Center to Contact for More Information: Source of additional information, usually sponsoring
NASA Center. See "CENTER CONTACTS'; page iL
Imolementation Method: A brief technical discussion that is not intended to give the full
details of the process, but rather to provide a design engineer with adequate information to
understand how the practice should be used.
Technical Rationale: A brief technical justification for the use of the practice.
Imaact 0f Nonoractice: A brief statement of what can be expected if use of the practice is
avoidecL
Related Practices: Identification of other topic areas in the manual that
contain related information.
.References: Publications that contain additional information about the
practice.
SPONSOR
OF
PRACTICE
Figure i
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ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
Practice:
At the onset of the design process, identify the operating conditions that will be
encountered during the life of the equipment.
Benefit_:
Each of the identified environmental factors requires consideration in the design process.
This assures that adequate environmental strength is incorporated into the design to
ensure reliability.
Programs That Certified Usage:
Space Electronic Rocket Test (SERT) I and II, Communication Technology Satellite
(CTS), ACTS, Space Experiments, Launch Vehicles, Space Power Systems, and Space
Station Freedom.
Center to Contact for More Information:
Lewis Research Center (LeRC)
Implementation Method:
To ensure a reliability-oriented design, determine the needed environmental resistance of
the equipment. The initial requirement is to define the operating environment for the
equipment. A Life-Cycle Environment Profile, containing this information, should be
developed.
A Life-Cycle Environment Profile is a forecast of events and associated environmental
conditions that an item experiences from manufacturing to retirement. The life cycle
includes the phases that an item will encounter such as: handling, shipping, or storage
prior to use; disposition between missions (storage, standby, or transfer to/from repair
sites); geographical locations of expected deployment; and platform environments. The
environment or combination of environments the equipment will
encounter at each phase should be determined. All deployment
scenarios should be described as a baseline to identify the environments LEWIS
most likely to be associated with each life cycle phase. The following CENTERRES_RCr_
factors should also be taken into account:
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ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
a. Hardware configuration.
b. Environment(s) that will be encountered.
c. Platform/hardware interfaces.
d. Interfaces with other equipment.
e. Absolute and relative duration of exposure phase.
f. Probability that environmental condition(s) will occur.
g. Geographical locations.
h. Any other information that will help identify environmental
conditions that may impact the item.
The steps in developing a Life-Cycle Environment Profile are as follows:
1) Describe anticipated events for an item of equipment, from
final factory acceptance through terminal expenditure or
removal from inventory.
2) Identify significant natural and induced environments or
combination of environments for each anticipated shipping,
storage, and logistic event (such as transportation, dormant
storage, stand-by, bench handling, and ready modes, etc.).
3) Describe environmental and stress conditions (in narrative
and statistical form) to which equipment will be subjected
during the life cycle. Data may be derived by calculation,
laboratory tests, or operational measurements. Estimated
data should be replaced with actual values as determined.
The profile should show the number of measurements used
to obtain the average value of these stresses and design
achievements as well as their variability (expressed as
standard deviation).
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ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
This analysis can be used to: develop environmental design criteria consistent with
anticipated operating conditions, evaluate possible effects of change in environmental
conditions, and provide traceability for the rationale applied in criteria selection for
future use on the same program or other programs.
A listing of typical environmental factors is included in Table 1.
TABLE 1: ENVIRONMENTAL COVERAGE CHECKLIST (TYPICAL)
NATURAL INDUCED
Albedo, Planetary IR
Clouds
Electromagnetic Radiation
Electrostatic Discharge
Fog
Freezing Rain
Frost
Fungus
Gravity, Low
Hail
Humidity, High
Humidity, Low
Ice
Ionized Gases
Lightning
Magnetics, Geo
Meteoroids
Pollution, Air
Pressure, High
Pressure, Low, Vacuum
Radiation, Cosmic, Solar
Rain
Salt Spray
Sand and Dust
Sleet
Snow
Temperature, High
Temperature, Low
Wind
Acceleration
Chemicals
Corona
Electromagnetic, Laser
Electromagnetic Radiation
Electrostatic Discharge
Explosion
Icing
Magnetics
Moisture
Nuclear Radiation
Shock, Pyro, Thermal
Space Debris
Temperature, High, Aero. Heating, Fire
Temperature, Low, Aero. Cooling
Turbulence
Vapor Trails
Vibration, Mechanical, Microphonics
Vibration, Acoustic
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Technical Rationale:
Given the dependence of equipment reliability on the operating conditions encountered
during the life cycle, it is important that such conditions be identified accurately at the
beginning of the design process. Environmental factors that strongly influence
equipment reliability are included in Table 1, which provides a checklist for
environmental coverage (typical).
Concurrent (combined) environments may be more detrimental to reliability than the
effects of a single environment. In characterizing the design process, design/test criteria
must consider both single and/or combined environments in anticipation of providing the
hardware capability to withstand the hazards identified in the system profile. The effects
of typical combined environments are illustrated in a matrix relationship in Figure 1,
which shows combinations where the total effect is more damaging than the cumulative
effect of each environment acting independently. For example, an item may be exposed
to a combination such as temperature, humidity, altitude, shock, and vibration while it is
being transported. The acceptance to end-of-life history of an item must be examined
for these effects. Table 2 provides reliability considerations for pairs of environmental
factors.
Each environmental factor that is present requires a determination of its impact on the
operational and reliability characteristics of the materials and parts comprising the
equipment being designed. Packaging techniques should be identified that afford the
necessary protection against the degrading factors.
In the environmental stress identification process that precedes selection of
environmental strength techniques, it is essential to consider stresses associated with all
life intervals of the equipment. This includes operational and maintenance environments
as well as the pre-operational environments, when stresses imposed on the parts during
manufacturing assembly, inspection, testing, shipping, and installation may have
significant impact on equipment reliability. Stresses imposed during the pre-operational
phase often are overlooked; however, they may represent a particularly harsh
environment that the equipment must withstand. Often, the environments to which
systems are exposed during shipping and installation are more severe than those
encountered during normal operating conditions. It is probable that some of the
environmental strength features that are contained in a system design pertain to
conditions that will be encountered in the pre-operational phase rather than during
actual operation.
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Figure 1. Effects of Combined Environments
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ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
TABLE 2: VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL PAIRS
High Temperature And
Humidity
High temperature tends to
increase the rate of moisture
penetration. The general
deterioration effects of humidity
are increased by high
temperatures.
High Temperature And
Low Pressure
Each of these environments
depends on the other. For
example, as pressure decreases,
outgassing of constituents of
materials increases; as
temperature increases, outgassing
increases. Hence, each tends to
intensify the effects of the other.
High Temperature
And Salt Spay
High temperature tends to
increase the rate of corrosion
caused by salt spray.
High Temperature and Solar High Temperature and Fungus High Temperature and Sand
Radiation and Dust
This is a man-independent
combination that causes
increasing effects on organic
materials.
A certain degree of high
temperature is necessary to permit
fungus and microorganisms to
grow. However, fungus and
microorganisms cannot develop
above 160°F (71°C).
High Temperature and
Acceleration
This combination produces the
same effect as high temperature
and shock and vibration.
tligh Temperature and Shock
and Vibration
Since both environments affect
common material properties, they
will intensify each other's effects.
The degree to which the effects
are intensified depends on the
magnitude of each environment in
the combination. Plastics and
polymers are more susceptible to
this combination than metals,
unless extremely high
temperatures are involved.
Low Temperature and Humidity High Temperature and Ozone
Relative humidity increases as
temperature decreases, and lower
temperature may induce moisture
condensation. If the temperature
is low enough, frost or ice may
result.
Starting at about 300°F (150°C)
temperature starts to reduce
ozone. Above about 520°F
(270°C), ozone cannot exist at
pressures normally encountered.
The erosion rate of sand may
be accelerated by high
temperature. However, high
temperature reduces sand
and dust penetration.
High Temperature and
Explosive Atmosphere
Temperature has minimal
effect on the ignition of an
explosive atmosphere but
does affect the air-vapor
ratio, which is an important
consideration.
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TABLE 2: VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL PAIRS
Low Temperature and Solar
Radiation
Low temperature tends to reduce
the effects of solar radiation and
vice versa.
Low Temperature and Low
Pressure
This combination can accelerate
leakage through seals, etc.
Low Temperature and Salt
Spray
Low temperature reduces the
corrosion rate of salt spray.
Low Temperature and Sand and Low Temperature and
Dust Fungus
Low temperature increases dust
penetration.
Low temperature reduces
fungus growth. At sub-zero
temperatures, fungi remain in
suspended animation.
Low Temperature and Shock and Low Temperature and Low Temperature and
Vibration Acceleration Explosive Atmosphere
This combination produces the
same effect as low temperature
and shock and vibration.
Low temperature tends to
intensify the effects of shock and
vibration. However, it is a
consideration only at very low
temperatures.
Temperature has minimal
effect on the ignition of an
explosive atmosphere but
does affect the air-vapor
ratio, which is an important
consideration.
Low Temperature and Ozone Humidity and Low Pressure Humidity and Salt Spray
Ozone effects are reduced at
lower temperatures but ozone
concentration increases with lower
temperatures.
Humidity increases the effects of
low pressure, particularly in
relation to electronic or electrical
equipment. However, the actual
effectiveness of this combination is
determined primarily by the
temperature.
High humidity may dilute the
salt concentration and could
affect the corrosive action of
the salt by increasing the
coverage, thcrcby increasing
the conductivity.
Humidity and Fungus Humidity and Sand and Dust Humidity and Solar
Radiation
Sand and dust have a natural
affinity for water and this
combination increases
deterioration.
Humidity helps the growth of
fungus and microorganisms but
adds nothing to their effects.
Humidity intensifies the
deteriorating effects of solar
radiation on organic
materials.
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TABLE 2: VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL PAIRS
Humidity and Vibration Humidity and Shock and Humidity and Explosive
Acceleration Atmosphere
This combination tends to
increase the rate of breakdown of
electrical material.
The periods of shock and
acceleration are considered too
short for these environments to be
affected by humidity.
Humidity has no effect on the
ignition of an explosive
atmosphere but a high
humidity will reduce the
pressure of an explosion.
Humidity and Ozone Low Pressure and Salt Spray Low Pressure and Solar
Radiation
This combination is not expected
to occur.
Ozone meets with moisture to
form hydrogen peroxide, which
has a greater deteriorating effect
on plastics and elastomers than
the additive effects of moisture
and ozone.
This combination does not
add to the overall effects.
Low Pressure and Fungus
This combination does not add to
the overall effects.
Low Pressure and Sand and Dust Low Pressure and Vibration Low Pressure and Shock or
Acceleration
This combination only occurs in
extreme storms during which
small dust particles are carried to
high altitudes.
This combination intensifies
effects in all equipment categories
but mostly with electronic and
electrical equipment.
These combinations only
become important at the
hyperenvironmental levels, in
combination with high
temperature.
Low Pressure and Explosive Salt Spray and Fungus Salt Spray and Dust
Atmosphere
This is considered an incompatible
combination.
At low pressures, an electrical
discharge is easier to develop but
the explosive atmosphere is
harder to ignite.
This will have the same
combined effect as humidity
and sand and dust.
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TABLE 2: VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL PAIRS
Salt Spray and Vibration Salt Spray and Shock or Salt Spray and Explosive
Acceleration Atmosphere
This will have the same combined These combinations produce no This is considered an
effect as humidity and vibration, added effects, incompatible combination.
Salt Spray and Ozone Solar Radiation and Fungus Solar Radiation and Sand
and Dust
This combination is similar to but
more corrosive than humidity and
ozone.
Because of the resulting heat from
solar radiation, this combination
probably produces the same
combined effect as high
temperature and fungus. Further,
the ultraviolet in unfiltered
radiation is an effective fungicide.
It is suspected that this
combination will produce
high temperatures.
Solar Radiation and Ozone Fungus and Ozone Solar Radiation and Shock
or Acceleration
This combination increases the Fungus is destroyed by ozone. These combinations produce
rate of oxidation of materials, no added effects.
Solar Radiation and Vibration Sand and Dust and
Vibration
Under vibration conditions, solar
radiation deteriorates plastics,
elastomers, oils, etc., at a higher
rate.
Shock and Vibration Vibration and Acceleration
This combination produces no
added effects.
This combination produces
increased effects when
encountered with high
temperatures and low pressure in
the hyperenvironmental ranges.
Solar Radiation and Explosive
Atmosphere
This combination produces no
added effects.
Vibration might possibly
increase the wearing effects
of sand and dust.
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Environmental stresses affect parts in different ways. Table 3 illustrates the principal
effects of typical environments on system parts and materials.
High temperatures impose a severe stress on most electronic items, since it can cause
catastrophic failure (such as melting of solder joints and burnout of solid-state devices).
High temperature also causes progressive deterioration of reliability due primarily to
chemical degradation effects. 1 It is often stated that excessive temperature is the
primary cause of poor reliability in electronic equipment.
In electronic systems design, great emphasis is placed on small size and high part
densities. This generally requires a cooling system to provide a path of low thermal
resistance from heat-producing elements to an ultimate heat sink of reasonably low
temperature.
Solid-state parts are rated in terms of maximum junction temperatures. The thermal
resistance is usually specified from this point to either case or to free air. Specification
of the maximum ambient temperature for which a part is suitable generally is not a
sufficient method for part selection, since the surface temperature of a particular part
can be greatly influenced by heat radiation or heat conduction effects from nearby parts.
These effects can lead to overheating, even though an ambient temperature rating
appears not to be exceeded. It is preferable to specify thermal environment ratings such
as equipment surface temperatures, thermal resistance paths associated with conduction,
convection, and radiation effects, and cooling provisions such as air temperature,
pressure, and velocity. In this manner, the true thermal state of the internal components
of temperature-sensitive components can be determined. Reliability improvement
techniques for high temperature stress include the use of heat dissipation devices, cooling
systems, thermal insulation, and heat-withstanding materials.
Low temperatures experienced by electronic equipment can cause reliability problems.
These problems usually are associated with mechanical system elements. They include
mechanical stresses produced by differences in the coefficients of expansion (contraction)
of metallic and nonmetallic materials, embrittlement of nonmetallic components,
mechanical forces caused by freezing of entrapped moisture, stiffening of liquid
constituents, etc. Typical examples include cracking of seams, binding of mechanical
linkages, and excessive viscosity of lubricants. Reliability improvement techniques for
low temperature stress include the use of heating devices, thermal insulation, and cold-
withstanding materials.
1See Practice No. PT-TE-1404, "Thermal Tcst Levels/Durations."
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TABLE 3: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
ENVIRONMENT
High temperature
PRINCIPAL EFFECTS
Thermal aging:
Oxidation
Structural change
Chemical reaction
Softening, melting, and
sublimation
TYPICAL FAILURES
INDUCED
Insulation failure
Alteration of electrical
properties.
Structural failure.
Low temperature
High relative humidity
Low relative humidity
High pressure
Viscosity reduction/evaporation
Physical expansion
Increased viscosity and
solidification
Ice formation
Embrittlement
Physical contraction
Moisture absorption
Chemical reaction
Corrosion
Electrolysis
Desiccation
Embrittlement
Granulation
Compression
Loss of lubrication properties.
Structural failure;
increased mechanical stress;
increased wear on moving parts.
Loss of lubrication properties.
Alteration of electrical
properties.
Loss of mechanical strength;
cracking, fracture.
Structural failure;
increased wear on moving parts.
Swelling, rupture of container;
Physical breakdown;
Loss of electrical strength;
Loss of mechanical strength;
Interference with function;
Loss of electrical properties;
Increased conductivity of
insulators.
Loss of mechanical strength;
Structural collapse;
Alteration of electrical
properties, "dusting".
Structural collapse;
Penetration of sealing;
Interference with function.
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TABLE 3: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
Low pressure
Solar radiation
Sand and dust
Salt spray
Wind
Expansion
Outgassing
Reduced dielcctrical strength of
air
Actinic and physicochemical
reactions:
Embrittlement
Abrasion
Clogging
Chemical reactions:
Corrosion
Electrolysis
Force application
Deposition of materials
Heat loss (low velocity)
Heat gain (high velocity)
Fracture of container;
Explosive expansion.
Alteration of electrical
properties;
Loss of mechanical strength.
Insulation breakdown and arc-
over;
Corona and ozone formation.
Surface deterioration;
Alteration of electrical
properties;
Discoloration of materials;
Ozone formation.
Increased wear.
Interference with function;
Alteration of electrical
properties.
Increased wear.
Loss of mechanical strength;
Alteration of electrical
properties;
Interference with function.
Surface deterioration;
Structural weakening;
Increased conductivity.
Structural collapse;
Interference with function
Loss of mechanical strength.
Mechanical Interference and
clogging;
Abrasion accelerated.
Accelerates low-temperature
effects.
Accelerates high-temperature
effects.
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TABLE 3: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
Rain
Temperature shock
High-speed particles
(nuclear irradiation)
Zero gravity
Ozone
Physical Stress
Water absorption and immersion
Erosion
Corrosion
Mechanical stress
Heating
Transmutation and ionization
Mechanical stress
Absence of convection cooling
Chemical reactions:
Crazing, cracking
Embrittlement
Granulation
Reduced dielectrical strength of
air
Structural collapse.
Increase in weight;
Electrical failure;
Structural weakening.
Removes protective coatings;
Structural weakening;
Surface deterioration.
Enhances chemical reactions.
Structural collapse or
weakening;
Seal damage.
Thermal aging;
Oxidation.
Alteration of chemical, physical,
and electrical properties;
Production of gases and
secondary particles.
Interruption of gravity-
dependent functions.
Aggravation of high-temperature
effects.
Rapid oxidation;
Alteration of electrical
properties;
Loss of mechanical strength;
Interference with function.
Insulation breakdown and arc-
over.
Explosive decompression Severe mechanical stress Rupture and cracking;
Structural collapse.
Dissociated gases Chemical reactions:
Contamination
Reduced dielectric strength
Alteration of physical and
electrical properties.
Insulation breakdown and arc-
over.
Acceleration Mechanical stress Structural collapse.
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TABLE 3: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
Vibration
Magnetic fields
Mechanical Stress
Fatigue
Induced magnetization
Loss of mechanical strength;
Interference with function;
Increased wear.
Structural collapse.
Interference with function;
Alteration of electrical
properties;
Induced heating.
Additional stresses are produced when electronic equipment is exposed to sudden
changes of temperature or rapidly changing thermal cycling conditions. These conditions
generate large internal mechanical stresses in structural elements, particularly when
dissimilar materials are involved. Effects of thermal shock-induced stresses include
cracking of seams, delamination, loss of hermeticity, leakage of fill gases, separation of
encapsulating materials from components and enclosure surface leading to the creation
of voids, and distortion of support members.
A thermal shock test may be specified to determine the integrity of solder joints since
such a test creates large internal forces due to differential expansion effects. Such a test
also has been found to be instrumental in creating segregation effects in solder alloys
leading to the formation of lead-rich zones, which are susceptible to cracking effects.
Electronic equipment often is subjected to environmental shock and vibration during
both normal use and testing. Such environments can cause physical damage to parts and
structural members when deflections produced cause mechanical stresses which exceed
the allowable working stress of the constituent parts.
Natural frequencies of items comprising the equipment are important parameters that
must be considered in the design process since a resonant condition can be produced if a
natural frequency is within the vibration frequency range. The resonance condition will
greatly amplify subsystem deflection and may increase stresses beyond the safe limit.
The vibration environment can be particularly severe for electrical connectors, since it
may cause relative motion between members of the connector. In combination with
other environmental stresses, this motion can produce fret corrosion. This generates
wear debris and causes large variation in contact resistance. Reliability improvement
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techniques for vibrational stress include the use of stiffening, control of resonance, and
reduced freedom of movement.
Humidity and salt air environments can cause degradation of equipment performance
since they promote corrosion effects in metallic components. They also can foster the
creation of galvanic cells, particularly when dissimilar metals are in contact. Another
deleterious effect of humidity and salt air atmosphere is the formation of surface films
on nonmetallic parts. These films cause leakage paths and degrade the insulation and
dielectric properties of these materials. Moisture absorption by insulating materials also
can cause a significant increase in volume conductivity and the dissipation factor of these
materials. Reliability improvement techniques for humidity and salt environments
include use of hermetic sealing, moisture-resistant material, dehumidifiers, protective
coatings/covers, and reduced use of dissimilar metals.
Electromagnetic and nuclear radiation can disrupt performance levels and, in some
cases, cause permanent damage to exposed equipment. Therefore, it is important that
such effects be considered in determining the environmental strength for electronic
equipment that must achieve a specified reliability goal.
Electromagnetic radiation often produces interference and noise effects within electronic
circuity, which can impair system performance. Sources of these effects include corona
or lightning discharges, sparking, and arcing phenomena. These may be associated with
high voltage transmission lines, ignition systems, brush type motors, and even the
equipment itself. Generally, the reduction of interference effects requires incorporating
filtering and shielding features or specifying less susceptible components and circuity.
Nuclear radiation can cause permanent damage by alteration of the atomic or molecular
structure of dielectric and semiconductor materials. High energy radiation also can
cause ionization effects that degrade the insulation levels of dielectric materials. The
migration of nuclear radiation effects typically involves materials and parts possessing a
higher degree of radiation resistance, and the incorporation of shielding and hardening
techniques.
Each environmental factor experienced by an item during its life cycle requires
consideration in the design process. This ensures that adequate environmental strength
is incorporated into the design for reliability.
PRACTICE NO. PD-EC-1101
PAGE 16 OF 16
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
Impact of Nonpractice:
Failure to perform a detailed life cycle environment profile can lead to overlooking
environmental factors whose effect is critical to equipment reliability. If these factors are
not included in the environmental design criteria and test program, environment-induced
failures may occur during space flight operations.
Reference_:
Government
1. MIL-HDBK-217E Notice 1, "Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment,"
January 1990.
2. MIL-HDBK-251, "Reliability/Design Thermal Applications," January 1978.
3. MIL-HDBK-338-1A, "Electronic Reliability Design Handbook," October 1988.
4. MIL-STD-810E, "Environmental Test Methods and Engineering Guidelines," July
1989.
Industry
5. EID-00866, Rocketdyne Division, Rockwell International, "Space Station Freedom
Electric Power System Reliability and Maintainability Guidelines Document,"
1990.
6. SAE G-11, Society of Automotive Engineers, Reliability, Maintainability, and
Supportability Guidebook, 1990.
N/ A
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Practice:
Derate applied stress levels for electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) part
characteristics and parameters with respect to the maximum stress level ratings of the
part. The allowed stress levels are established as the maximum levels in circuit
applications.
Benefits:
Derating lowers the probability of failures occurring during assembly, test, and flight.
Decreasing mechanical, thermal, and electrical stresses lowers the possibility of
degradation or catastrophic failure.
Program That Certified Usage:
All Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) flight programs
Center to Contact for More Information:
GSFC
Implementation:
EEE parts derating can be established as either design policies or from reliability
requirements. In general, NASA has taken the approach of establishing derating policies
that cover all applications of the various part types in space flight equipment. These
policies are available in MIL-STD-975, "NASA Standard Parts List." Table 1 provides
typical derating factors from that document. If derating is to be determined from a
reliability requirement, the reference document is MIL-HDBK-217, "Reliability
Prediction of Electronic Equipment." MIL-HDBK-217 contains the information
necessary to quantitatively estimate the effects of stress levels on reliability.
GODDARD
SPACE FLIGHT
CENTER
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TABLE 1. TYPICAL PART DERATING GUIDELINES
PART TYPE RECOMMENDED DERATING LEVEL
Capacitors Max. of 60% of rated voltage
Resistors Max. of 60% of rated power
Semiconductor Devices Max. of 50% of rated power
Max. of 75% of rated voltage
Max. junction temperature of 110°C
Microcircuits Max. supply voltage of 80% of rated voltage
Max. of 75% of rated power
Max. junction temperature of 100°C
Inductive Devices Max. of 50% of rated voltage
Max. of 60% of rated temperature
Relays and Connectors Max. of 50% of rated current
NOTE: Maximum junction temperature levels should not be exceeded at any time or during
any ground, test, or flight exposure. Thermal design characteristics should preclude exceeding
the stated temperature levels.
Technical Rationale:
The reliability of a EEE part is directly related to the stresses caused by the application,
including both the environment and the circuit operation. MIL-HDBK-217 contains
specific part failure rate models for a wide variety of part types. The models include
factors for calculating the effects of various stresses on the failure rate and thus on part
reliability. The types of factors include (for example): environment, quality levels,
voltage, frequency, and temperature. Given the extensive tables of factors in MIL-
HDBK-217, one can formulate reliability predictions for piece parts.
As shown in Figure 1, the plot of piece part failures versus an application stress level
such as temperature, voltage, or current indicates decreasing failure rates for lower levels
of stress. Therefore, a part's reliability in an application can be increased by
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decreasing the maximum allowed stress levels from the absolute maximum for which a
part is rated.
Derating policy documents such as those prepared by NASA and DoD, and generally
required in their contracts, allow the designer to avoid lengthy and involved calculations
by mandating the derating of specific characteristics and parameters.
FAILURE
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Figure 1. Piece-part Failure Rate vs. Temperature
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HIGH VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY DESIGN
AND MANUFACTURING PRACTICES
Practice:
Thoroughly test high voltage power supply packaging on flight configured engineering
models, in a simulated space flight environment, to evaluate corona effects.
BenefitS:
Process controls on design, manufacturing, and testing operations reduce component
failure rates and improve reliability. The goal is production of power supplies that will
operate in space for the mission duration.
Programs That Certified Usage:
Space Electronic Rocket (SERT) Tests I and II, Communication Technology Satellite
(CTS), 30 cm Thruster Bi-module.
Center to Contact for More Information:
Lewis Research Center (LeRC)
Implementation Method:
There are special requirements in packaging HV power supplies for space use. The
power processor should be voltage-partitioned and the low voltage circuits should be
separated from the high voltage circuits. This is usually done with a metal wall. There
still will be signals transmitted between the sections. All grounds should be isolated to
provide a means to predict the currents when transients or arcs occur. When capacitors
discharge, there can be current flows of several hundred amperes. The low voltage
section should be protected from these current and voltage surges.
Table 1 shows recommended design practices used for an 11 kV CTS TWT power
supply. All volumes must be vented. The pressure in any unvented volume will decrease
gradually and result in corona or arcing. Allow for screens, RF traps,
etc.; and count only the holes in the screens. Interior volumes, down to
the capped nut plates, must also be vented.
LEWIS
RESEARCH
CENTER
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AND MANUFACTURING PRACTICES
TABLE 1. HIGH VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY DESIGN GUIDELINES
PHYSICAL LAYOUT
Voltage Partitioning (Separate high and low voltage components)
Isolated Grounds (Provide known current path for transients)
Voltage Suppression (Suppress signal from high voltage to low
voltage circuits)
ELECTRIC FIELDS
Solid Dielectric:
DC Stress
AC Stress
50 Volts/MIL
10 Volts/MIL
Surface Creepage
Air or Vacuum Gap
8 Volts/MIL
20 Volts/MIL
VENTING
> 2 cm 2 per 1000cc of enclosed volume (screens and RF traps
reduce vent size), including:
Capped nut plates
Dielectric spacers
Polyolefin shrinkable tubing
High voltage connectors
Figure 1 shows the fabrication methods used to build this supply. Round off all edges on
metal as well as dielectric materials. Use anti-corona spheres. Void-free encapsulation
is important. Remove excess RTV from bolts to keep vent paths open. Use shrink
tubing in strips for hold downs, to avoid trapped air. Dielectric separators must be sized
correctly for surface creepage. Anti-corona spheres should have a vent hole to eliminate
voids in the solder. Dielectric inserts should be slotted to vent the interior volume.
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Figure 1. High Voltage Power Supply Fabrication
Figure 2 illustrates the special construction methods used in the HV compartment for
the equipment to operate in the thermal and vacuum environment of space.
Figure 2.
HV Compartment
Construction
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Figure 2. HV Compartment Construction (Continued)
Table 2 shows the testing methods that should be used to check out the HV power
supply. The glass epoxy boards should be scanned ultrasonically to check for density
differences. The transformers and components mounted on the boards should be
corona-tested. Corona discharges of less than 5 picocoulombs are allowed. Induced
voltage in the dielectric testing should be done in vacuum at temperature per MIL-T-27.
The corona tests should be repeated to detect internal degradation from the high voltage
stress. Be careful to bake out the components at 65°C for 72 hours in the vacuum
chamber and cool the components down before the power supply is turned on.
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HIGH VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY DESIGN
AND MANUFACTURING PRACTICES
TABLE 2. TESTING
Corona Testing: Transformers
Component Configuration on Boards
< 5 Picocoulombs
Electric Testing: Induced voltage (twice-rated voltage)
Dielectrical withstanding (2.5 times rated AC and DC)
Important to perform in vacuum at temperature
Thermal Testing: Minimum of 10 temperature cycles at component level
Minimum of 3 temperature cycles at box level
Initial thermal-vacuum test preceded by bakeout of 65°C for 72 hours
Ultrasonic Scanning of Glass Epoxy Boards (NASA TM X-73432)
Technical Rationale:
These design criteria were developed experimentally. The various component
configurations, board layouts, and component assemblies were tested to 125% of
expected working voltage in air, vacuum, and full operating temperature with a
requirement that the corona inception measured less than 5 picocoulombs.
An example of an early flight failure caused by corona was a short that developed
between two pins of a high voltage connector. Gas trapped inside connector voids
gradually decreased in pressure until corona discharge began to decompose the insulating
material. When the insulating material thickness was reduced to the point that leakage
started increasing, a carbon tree formed and a short occurred, disabling the experiment.
This can be easily avoided by running corona tests on all high voltage parts to ensure
that no gases are trapped in high voltage circuits.
Impact of Nonpractice:
Allowing High Voltage power supplies that have not been thoroughly tested for corona
to operate in space has resulted in corona-caused shorts that disabled the power supply.
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References:
1. MIDT-27, "Transformers and Inductors (Audio, Power and High-Power Pulse),
General Specification for," August 08, 1987.
2. NASA CP 2159, "Spacecraft Transmitter Reliability," September 1979.
3. NASA TMX-3287, Lalli, Vincent R., Nueller, Larry A., and Koutnik, Ernest A.,
"System Reliability Analysis Through Corona Testing," September 1975.
Presented at Power Electronics Specialist Conference (sponsored by IEEE),
Culver City, CA (June 9-11, 1975).
4. NASA TMX-73432, Klima, S. J. and P. J. Riley, "Ultrasonic Evaluation of High
Voltage Circuit Boards," June 1976.
5. NAS3-17782, Cronin, D. L., "Modeling and Analysis of Power Circuits," TRW
Systems Group, June 1975.
6. NAVMAT P4855-1, "Navy Power Supply Reliability Design and Manufacturing
Guidelines," December 1982.
7. Foster, W.M., '-Thermal Test Report for the Space Acceleration Measurement
System Circuit Boards", NASA Lewis Code 6730 Internal Report, November 1987
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CLASS S PARTS IN
HIGH RELIABILITY APPLICATIONS
Practice:
Use Class S and Grade 1 or equivalent parts in all applications requiring high reliability
or long life 1 to yield the lowest possible failure rates.
Benefits:
Low parts failure rates in typical circuit applications result in significant system reliability
enhancement. For space systems involving serviceability, the Mean-Time-Between-
Failure (MTBF) is greatly extended, which significantly reduces maintenance
requirements and crew time demands.
Implementation Method:
Redundancy is an appropriate usage of resources - especially in critical applications to
protect against random failures - but is not a justification for using less than Class S or
"equivalent" parts. Establish a policy that Class S parts will be used without exception or
that limited exceptions are only permitted with extensive testing and inspections for
upgrading of Class B to an acceptable level (approximately Class S or Grade 1).
Programs That Certified Usage:
Viking, VGR, and GLL
Center tO Contact for Information:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
Technical Rationale:
Basic reliability is a function of parts failure rates. In any analytical calculations of
reliability, the usage conditions of parts (derating, temperature, stress, etc.) are expressed
as a failure rate that integrates these conditions from empirical or
analytical considerations. High reliability parts (Class S or Grade 1)
are screened and tested to yield the lowest failure rate parts ,Tzr
producible in large quantities (refer to Table 1 for the relationship rROVVLSXONLABORATORY
of Class S to Class B). The failure rates of Class S parts are
1 Long life is defined as a requirement to perform the defined function without sacrifice to the primary
mission objectives for a period longer than 3 years. Criticality of a function may require high reliability for
any period of time and is not necessarily coupled to long life. However, when high reliability is coupled with
long life, increased attention to the best reliability design practices is appropriate.
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generally about one fourth of those for Class B. When parts failure rates are coupled
into circuit applications, the effects can magnify significantly depending on the circuit
configuration.
When the space equipment is not serviceable in a system requiring high reliability and
long life, the lowest possible failure rate parts should be selected. This is especially true
when considering the economics associated with the launch costs. For example, when
changing from Class S to Class B parts, the parts cost decreases by a factor of 4x _ 10x
but the reliability of the system decreases significantly (by 20 --, 50 times in the typical 5-
year mission example provided). When total system, mission operations, and launch
costs are considered, the delta between the parts costs for Class S and Class B is a
minute percentage of total cost. This is especially true for Space Shuttle payloads.
On systems that are serviceable, the MTBF of an assembly is extended in proportion to
the basic failure expectation. This significantly longer MTBF reduces on-orbit service
requirements with less time demand on the crew, less risk associated with extravehicular
activity (EVA), fewer spares required, and fewer launches to transport spares.
Redundancy has a much lower reliability payoff than does parts class - until it is needed.
Maverick parts, workmanship flaws, and other uncertainties justify redundancy for critical
circuits in high reliability, long life applications to protect against random failures. For
long life, the use of high reliability hardware, Class S (or Grade 1) parts, and redundancy
in critical applications, provide an optimum and cost-effective approach.
Impact of Noncompliance:
A typical radio and digital subsystem, for a flight instrument with a 3-year mission, has
been analyzed considering no redundancy (except TWTs) and partial redundancy in
critical circuits for both Class S and B parts.
The parts count method provided in MIL-HDBK-217E was applied. These calculations
are not considered accurate for any usage in an absolute sense, due to other design and
test factors the data base cannot estimate. However, relative comparisons are very
useful and accurate for tradeoff studies of effects of redundancy and parts classifications.
The data are presented in graphical format for ease of understanding. On each plot, the
basic reliability for the assumed conditions is plotted on the left ordinate, years are
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plotted on the abscissa, and the ratio of the analyzed condition is plotted on the right
ordinate.
In a single-string (nonredundant) design (Figure 1), the decline in system reliability over
time is much less for a system built entirely of Class S parts than if it were built of Class
B parts. The ratio of the two reliabilities for a 5-year mission indicates the system built
of Class S parts is 50 times more reliable than the system built of Class B parts.
When critical system circuits are made redundant, the time dependent reliability with
both Class S and B parts is improved, but the improvement for the system built with B
parts is greater (Figure 2). However, the 5-year mission reliability for the system built
with B parts is still 20 times less than for the system built with Class S parts.
A correlation is made between the single string (nonredundant) system built with Class S
parts and the system with redundant critical circuits and Class B parts (Figure 3). In this
correlation, it is clear that for a 5-year mission the single-string system with Class S parts
was still 10 times more reliable than the system with redundancy made from Class B
parts.
This example reflects that the payoff in reliability is significant for Class S parts
compared to Class B parts (for a 5-year mission, Class S is 20 --, 50 times more reliable
depending on redundancy). Additionally, the return on reliability, addressing non-
random failures, is higher for Class S parts than for redundancy used with Class B parts.
The highest reliability is obtained with Class S parts with redundancy in the critical
circuits.
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TABLE 1. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CLASS S AND CLASS B PARTS
ISSUE
Wafer lot
acceptance
Certification of
production facilities
Precap internal
inspection
PIND for loose
particle detection
Serialization
Interim electrical
test between test
phases
Burn-in
Reverse bias
burn-in
Interim electrical
test after reverse
bias burn-in
Radiographic
inspection
Nondestructive
100% bond pull test
CLASS S
Required
To specific
assembly
lines
100%
Required
Required
Required
240 hours
Required
Required
Required
100%
CLASS B
To technologies
and general
facilities only
Sampled
160 hours
Sampled
IMPACT
Uniformity and pedigree
traceability
Burn-in and screening value
relates to consistency of
original product
Significant driver on level of
reliability - criteria much more
stringent in MIL-M-38510H
Loose metallics in zero g field
can cause failures
Traceability lost
Potential of passing over
problems and their causes
Later problem discovery
Impurity migration not
detected
Effects of reverse bias burn-in
may be masked by subsequent
actions
Observation of latent defects
Parts with mechanical
deficiencies get into equipment
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PART JUNCTION TEMPERATURE
Practice:
Maintain part junction temperatures during flight below 60°C. (Short-term mission
excursions associated with transient mission events are permissible.)
Benen_:
Reliability is greatly increased because the failure rate is directly related to the long-term
flight temperature.
Programs That Certified Usage:
VGR, GLL, Viking, Mariner series
Center to Contact for Information:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
Implementation Method:
Establish in-specification design (and test) temperatures >75°C and limit part junction
temperatures (JT) to <ll0°C t which constrains permissible part junction temperature
rise (AJT) to <35°C.
Technical Rationale:
Basic reliability is directly related to temperature and time, i.e., ), = f(T,t). The
following relationship is obtained either theoretically from the Arrhenius relationship
(), = Aexp[-Ea/k (1/T - I/T0)]) or empirically from the data in MIL-HDBK-217E.
)'A
,_ (Failure
Rate)
Given:
I . Specific part
- I . Specific derating factor
, Specific chemicali I "
t [ activation
t I energy
T A TB
JET
PROPULSION
LABORATORY
2This practice has been verified on programs in place before the release of MIL-STD-975H. If the
MIL-STD-975H junction temperature of 100°C is used, junction temperature rise should be changed to
assure that long-term flight junctions stay below 60°C.
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The curve shape is representative of all electronic parts (and most mechanical processes)
in the range of temperature typified by space exposure. Simply stated, the higher the
long-term flight temperatures, the lower the reliability:
B failures _ ks
A failures _'a
Assume that a design and test temperature of 75°C is chosen. In the figure from MIL-
STD-883B reproduced on page 4, observe that a 25°C AT corresponds to a failure rate
increase of more than an order of magnitude, i.e., > 1000% difference. MIL-HDBK-
217E has different values but the factor is up to approximately 3X on some parts
(depends on derating criteria and parts qualification). The following example illustrates
the effect of this relationship to design and test temperatures.
Assume the following conditions as an example:
Case A: T = 75°C in-specification design temperature for baseplate
Case B: T = 50°C in-specification design temperature for baseplate
Ease A and Case B:
T = 25°C long-duration flight temperature for baseplate
Jar = 110°C limit for any exposure or analysis
PRACTICE NO. PD-ED-1204
PAGE 3 OF 4
PART JUNCTION TEMPERATURE
Then:
Design/Test Parameters
Case A Case B
Design Baseplate 75°C 50°C
JT limit 110°C 110°C
Permitted AJT rise 35°C 60°C
Flight Conditions
Fit h _ Fit Flt _ @Flt
Base- _ ° JT =60°C JT =85°C * Base-
plate I I_ plate
T = 25°C [,,,,1 " A T = 25°C
AT = 25°C
from Arrhenius
Reliability (Case A)
Reliability (Case B)
10
> m
1
NOTE: In the example given, short-term ground test exposure on the order of 1-2 weeks
will use an insignificant amount of life in hardware designed for long-life/high reliability,
e.g., a 1-week thermal vacuum test at 75°C provides a short-term high temperature
screen in the actual circuit usage configuration to provide confidence for a long-term
exposure under flight conditions (JT < 60°C), and uses only 0.018% of the parts
capability. This demonstration is an important element in establishing prelaunch
confidence in design adequacy.
Impact of Non-Practice:
Reliability of electronic parts will be reduced significantly.
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SURFACE CHARGING / ESD ANALYSIS
Pr_lctice:
Considering the natural environment, perform spacecraft charging analyses to determine
that the energy that can be stored by each nonconductive surface is less than 3 nd.
Determine the feasibility of occurrence of electrostatic discharges (ESD). ESD should
not be allowed to occur on surfaces near receivers/antenna operating at less than 8 GHz
or on surfaces near sensitive circuits. For this practice to be effective, a test program to
demonstrate the spacecraft's immunity to a 3 mJ ESD is required.
Bene_:
Surfaces that are conceivable ESD sources can be identified early in the program.
Design changes such as application of a conductive coating and use of alternate materials
can be implemented to eliminate or reduce the ESD risk. Preventive measures such as
the installation of RC filters on sensitive circuits also can be implemented to control the
adverse ESD effects.
Pro_ams That Certified Usage:
Voyager, Galileo
Center to Contact for Information:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
Implementation Method:
Use a validated computer code (NASCAP or other appropriate computer code) to
determine the maximum differential charging (V) of each nonconductive surface. When
differential charging occurs, an electric field is developed within the dielectric material.
The magnitude of the electric field (E) is given by:
E = V/d
where d is the thickness of the dielectric material. Usually, when
this electric field is greater than 2x10 5 V/cm, ESD is likely to occur.
To determine the charging level, electrical properties of the
nonconductive material must be known. These properties include
JET
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(but are not limited to) surface resistivity, bulk resistivity, secondary and backscatter
electron emission coefficient, and photoelectron yield. For materials with unknown
electrical properties, the charging level must be determined by a ground test. In the
ground test, the nonconductive surface is exposed to simulated charging environments
(mission-dependent) and the resulting charging levels are measured.
ESD must not be allowed to occur on surfaces near sensitive RF receivers and on
surfaces near sensitive circuits. For other surfaces, the energy of an ESD should be
limited to 3 mJ. The ESD energy can be determined with the following equation:
W = 1/2CV 2
where C is the capacitance of the nonconductive surface with respect to spacecraft
ground. The value C depends on the geometry (area and thickness) of the
nonconductive surface. The ESD energy as a function of capacitance and charging level
is displayed in Figure 1. Usually, the best way to reduce the ESD energy is to limit the
value of V. This usually implies the use of a more conductive material. Since the
charging current available in the space environment is relatively low, material with
resistivity of 10 9 Ohm-cm is considered adequate for effective charge control.
1.0E+05
}
tu
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>
1.0E+04
1.0[+05
Figure 1. ESD Energy as a Function of Capacitance and Voltage
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Technical Rationale:
In an environment of energetic electrons, spacecraft surface charging can occur. Due to
their high resistivities, dielectric surfaces can be charged to different potentials than the
metallic surfaces (which should be at spacecraft ground potential). When the electric
field that results from differential charging is sufficiently high, an ESD would occur.
ESD is an intense source of electromagnetic interference (EMI). The EMI energies that
can be capacitively and inductively coupled to electronic circuits are proportional to both
the magnitude and rate of increase (dI/dt) of the discharge current, respectively. Under
most conditions, the discharge current (I) is directly related to the energy (W) of a
discharge. By minimizing the ESD energy, the magnitude of discharge current and the
magnitude of ESD-induced EMI on circuits can be reduced.
The typical energy required to damage a sensitive IC is an order of several _J. The
energy required to upset a circuit is approximately 10 times less. In a typical discharge,
only a fraction of the stored electrostatic energy can be coupled to a circuit. The
coupling efficiency is dependent on the shielding and geometry of the spacecraft.
Restricting the energy of an ESD minimizes the amount of energy available for IC
damage and circuit upset, resulting in a more reliable spacecraft. In the Voyager ESD
system test program, a 30 rnJ discharge did not disturb spacecraft operation. However,
differences in spacecraft configurations and circuit protection devices (e.g., RC filters in
sensitive circuits) means that the "safe" (maximum allowable) energy could be different
for different spacecraft configurations. Thus, 3 mJ was chosen as the maximum
allowable energy.
Impact of Nonpractice:
Unpredictable operational anomalies and electronic parts failure caused by in-flight ESD
events. Consequences could be catastrophic.
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Practice:
Implement a 100% nondestructive screening test on EEE parts prior to assembly, which
would prevent early-life failures (generally referred to as infant mortality).
Benefits:
A lower rework cost during manufacturing and lower incident of component failures
during flight.
Program That Certified Usage:
All Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) flight programs.
Centers to Contact for More Information:
• GSFC
• Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) for missions referencing long-life, high reliability,
or more stringent requirements.
Implementation Method:
Screening for each part can be established as follows:
• Refer to NASA's compilation of screening criteria for use with various EEE part
types. An example may be found in Appendix C of the GSFC Preferred Parts
List.
• If Class S parts are purchased, the screening tests shown in Table 1 have already
been conducted. When Class S parts are not available, the screens of Table 1
should be used.
• Failure criteria during screening should specify Percent
Defectives Allowable (PDA) and allowable parameter drift.
Typical PDA criterion is 5%.
A sample listing of failure mechanisms, the associated distribution of
failures, and related screening tests are provided in Table 2.
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TABLE 2. FAILURE MECHANISMS/SCREENING METHODS
Failure Distribution Screen Tests
Mechanism of Failures
Metallization 11% Burn-in, Internal Visual,
Temperature Cycling, Scanning
Electron Microscope for
Metallization
Diffusion 1% Burn-in
Oxide Faults 14% Burn-in
Bulk 3% Stabilization Bake, Burn-in,
Temperature Cycling
Surface 21% Internal Visual, Radiography,
PIND, Constant Acceleration,
Stabilization Bake, Burn-in
Interconnect 9% Temp. Cycling, Burn-in, Constant
Acceleration
Wirebond 1%
40%Package
Nondestructive Bond Pull,
Stabilization Bake, Temperature
Cycling, Constant Acceleration,
Internal Visual, Burn-in,
Radiography, PIND
PIND, Radiography, Seal,
External Visual, Temperature
Cycling, Constant Acceleration
Technical Rationale:
The EEE parts manufacturing is controlled by military specification requirements
covering a variety of areas such as: starting materials, process controls, electrical or
electromechanical performance characteristics, and periodic inspections of some
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characteristics of finished product. Despite these requirements, defects that cause early-
life failures can be randomly built into a product. The screening tests are designed to be
destructive to parts with particular defects but nondestructive to good parts.
As an example, integrated circuits such as CMOS are highly susceptible to electrical
performance failures caused by ionic contamination on the die surface. The
contamination can be introduced by any of several uncontrollable avenues during
manufacture and cannot be ruled out as an occurrence in any given lot of parts. To
avoid early-life failures at higher assembly levels, the lot of parts is subjected to a 100%
static burn-in. The burn-in is designed to drive contamination into the die areas where it
will interfere with proper circuit operation and cause electrical failures before parts are
installed on boards.
Impact of Nonpractice:
Without screening, there could be latent failure mechanisms that could cause flight
delays and/or failures. For example, two circuits on the Solar Maximum Mission (SMM)
spacecraft failed. The failed parts were analyzed upon return from the repair mission
and found to contain defects that would have been revealed through screening. In one
case, the microcircuit had a metallization flaw; in the second, the CMOS microcircuit
had contamination on the die. In another example, screening tests performed on
microcircuits resulted in an 85% failure rate. Subsequent failure analysis revealed that
improper parts had been used.
References:
1. NASA GSFC Preferred Parts List (NPPL) 18/19.
. Seidl, Raymond H., Garry, William J., "Pi Factors Revisited," Proceedings of the
Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, 1990.
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Practice:
As a minimum, run eight thermal cycles over the approximate temperature range for
hardware that cycles in flight over ranges greater than 20°C. The last three thermal
cycles should be failure-free.
Benefit:
Demonstrates readiness of the hardware to operate in the intended cyclic environment.
Precipitates defects from design or manufacturing processes that could result in flight
failures.
Programs That Certified Usage:
ATLAS, CENTAUR, Space Electronic Rocket Tests (SERTs) 1 and 2, Communication
Technology Satellite (CTS), GOES, COBE, NOAA, LANDSAT, Solar Maximum
Mission
Centers to Contact for Information:
Lewis Research Center (LeRC)
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
Implementation Method:
As part of ATP, run at least eight thermal cycles over the temperature range experienced
by the hardware during storage, shipping, launch, flight, and reentry. The maximum and
minimum temperatures anticipated should be exceeded by 10°C. The last three thermal
cycles should be failure-free.
Equipment must stabilize at these limits before cycling to the opposing limit. Equipment
generally should be operated within the anticipated thermal range rather than at the
thermal limits.
Thermal cycling should be conducted in a vacuum if the test item is
designed to operate in a vacuum. LEWIS
RESEARCH
CENTER
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Technical Rationale:
Thermal cycle modeling has shown that the general form of the thermal cycling test math
model is given by Equation (1).
TE = F x Pa [1 - exp(4,oNKaT)] (1)
Where: TE = Test Effectiveness
F = Fraction of total failures that can be precipitated by a thermal cycle
Pd = Probability of detection
)'0 = Failure rate at T O
N = Number of thermal cycles
K = A constant
AT = T-T o
T = Operating temperature for ),
T o = Operating temperature for _'o
Fig. 1 shows that the failures available are the sum of three parts:
°
2.
3.
Failures detected by thermal cycle tests
Undetected failures
Failures not precipitated
For single temperature range of 50°C, the test effectiveness equation reduces to
Equation (2).
TE = 0.9 x Pd (1 - e "0"0864N) (2)
Figure 2 shows a plot of Equation (2) based on a probability of detection, Pd, of 0.9.
The equation is based on values of )'0 and K that were found by solving two
simultaneous equations derived from the data base provided in Table 1.
Printed circuit boards (PCBs) are especially prone to solder joint cracking. The design is
required to minimize the mechanical forces, as generated by thermal mismatch of
materials or vibration, in the solder joints.
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Fig. 2 Test Effectiveness Plot for AT = 50°C
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Impact of Nonpractice:
Design and manufacturing defects that could have been detected during ground testing
manifest themselves during flight.
Related Practices:
Solder Joint Fatigue Cycles, Thermal Dwell Testing.
References
1. GDCD BNZ 69-007, Curssell, G. M., "Atlas and Centaur Component Acceptance
Test Plan," 1984.
2. NASA TMX-53731, Van Orden, R. E., "Mounting of Components to Printed
Wiring Boards," 1968.
3. Laube, R. B., "Space Vehicle Thermal Cycling Test Parameters," Proceeding of
the Institute of Environmental Sciences, 1983.
4. Nelson, C. E., "System Level Reliability Thermal Cycling," Proceeding of the
Institute of Environment Sciences, 1983.
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Practice:
Use thermographic mapping methods to locate hot spots on operating PC boards.
Bene_:
Quick find of electronic components operating at or above recommended temperatures.
Also, this technique can validate the derating factors and thermal design via low cost
testing versus analysis.
Programs That Certified Usage:
Space Acceleration Measurement System (SAMS), Isothermal Dendritic Growth
experiment (IDGE), and STDCE
Center to Contact for More Information:
Lewis Research Center (LeRC)
Implementation Method:
Using an infrared camera and the flight PC board, make thermographic pictures of the
prototype PC boards in operation. Verify the thermograph and determine the delta T to
the actual use environment with thermocouples. Shut down the equipment and prepare
it for a vacuum test.
The board to be tested is placed in a mother board with the appropriate +5 V and
_+12 V power supplies. Power is applied to the board, and after a short period, a video
recording of the board is made with an infrared camera.
Technical Rationale:
The following procedure is used to determine the temperature of each component:
Junction temperature: Tj = TA+ TjA (])
LEWIS
Where: Tj = Junction Temperature RV.SVaRCn
T A = Ambient Temperature CENTER
TjA = Junction to Ambient Temperature Rise I Ill
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Tj = 40°C for this example
The case temperature, T o which is measured on the bench at room ambient is given by
Equation (2):
T c = Tj- OcAP (2)
Where: T c = case temperature
OCA = case to ambient thermal resistance
P = Power dissipated
For reliability purposes, it is necessary to keep junction temperatures for CMOS devices
at or below 49°C. The case temperature to be measured on the bench comes out to be
T c = 34°C for this application.
Infrared pictures are made of the PCB mounted outside the package on extended
connectors while the equipment is operating on the bench. The logic IC temperature is
determined from the infrared picture. If less than or equal to 34°C, the junctions are at
the desired operating temperature. If greater than 34°C, the reason for the higher
temperature is determined. Corrective action is worked out and approved by the
Engineering Review Board.
Figure 1 is a drawing of the component layout of the SCSI card, and Figure 2 is a
thermographic photograph of the board. Thermographic pictures are usually in color,
but in this monochrome reproduction, the cross hairs are at the hottest location (128°F),
black represents 108°F, white is 98°F, dark grey is 88°F, and light grey is 78°F.
The operating temperature with the board back in the case is checked by several
thermocouples attached to the hottest observed components. This is done in a simulated
use environment, perhaps during the thermal environment tests. The resultant delta-T is
added to the measured case temperature as a final check of the junction temperature,
Tj, in the end-use environment. For sample logic IC, the delta T was 5°C so the
resultant junction temperature is 45°C in the package. This is below the guideline of
49°C.
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Impact of Nonpraetice:
Allowing undetected hot spots to exist in flight hardware can be very expensive since the
later a problem is detected in a flight program, the more it costs to repair. Using
thermography to verify system engineering models is a fast, low-cost technique.
References:
. Crall, R. F., "Thermal Imaging Benchtop Analysis for Reliability," Evaluation
Engineering, December 1989.
. Masi, C. G., "What Can Thermal Imaging Do for You?, " Test & Measuremen$
World, May 1988.
. MIL-HDBK-217E, "Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment," Rome Air
Defense Center, October 27, 1986.
, Foster, W. M., "Thermal Test Report for the Space Acceleration Measurement
System Circuit Boards", NASA LeRC Code 6730 Internal Report, November
1987.
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Practice;
Perform thermal dwell test I on protoflight hardware over the temperature range of
+ 75°C/-20°C (applied at the thermal control/mounting surface or shearplate) for 24
hours at the cold end and 144 to 288 hours at the hot end.
Benefit;
This test, coupled with rigorous design practices, provides high confidence that the
hardware design is not marginal in its intended long life high reliability mission.
Programs Which Certified Usage:
Voyager, Galileo, Viking and Mariner Series
Center to Contact for Information;
JPL
Implementation Method:
Establish a minimum hardware test temperature level range of -20°C/+75°C and specify
that a single cycle thermal dwell test be performed for the appropriate durations (24
hours cold and 144 to 288 hours hot).
Technical Rationale:
In the early I960's, JPL adopted a conservative set of thermal design and test
temperature levels to demonstrate hardware design adequacy. As a starting point, a
reasonable short term flight temperature excursion (+5°C to +50°C) was established for
thermal control surfaces (shearplates). The +5°C lower level is a few degrees Celsius
above the freezing point of Hydrazine, thus integrated thermal control of bus electronics
and propulsion systems is possible. The 50°C upper limit is the
approximate level reached by a louvered bus electronics bay after
about one hour of full (perpendicular) solar irradiance at one A. U. JET
(astronomical unit) and accomodates near earth maneuvers. The PROrULSIOS
long term desired thermal control range is typically 25_+5°C, but this taBORXTORY
_Thermal dwell testing is the standard practice at JPL for systems/components which do not thermally
cycle during flight. For systems/components that do thermally cycle (generally over a range > 20 °C) in
flight, JPL practice is to cycle over a conservative range for three times the number of flight cycles.
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range may be broader depending on the tradeoffs of long term reliability and thermal
control costs. This original approach reduced the overall complexity of the system
thermal control design process: the wide range reduced the sensitivity to louver/radiator
size, heater size, power variations, etc. A margin of _+25°C was then applied to the
Allowable Flight range for qualification/protoflight test levels of assemblies mounted to
such thermal control surfaces. These levels accommodate thermal compromises in the
design where the short term extremes may be approached during steady state operation
and also has been demonstrated to provide an effective screen of assemblies. This
resulted in the JPL standard minimum test range of -20°C to + 75°C (for electronic
assemblies in particular).
These conservative test level ranges lead to several desirable features. The conservative
high temperature limit restricts the permitted temperature rise from the shearplate to the
junction of electronic piece-parts. Thus junction temperatures during the bulk of a
mission are much cooler than assemblies designed and tested at lower shearplate
temperatures. The increase in theoretical reliability is on the order of a factor of 10 per
25°C. 2
There are at least two failure mechanisms for both design and workmanship that should
be screened by an adequate thermal environmental test of any given assembly. The first
is based on Arrhenius rate related physics where time at high temperature is the key to
demonstrating reliability during testing. Electronic part life is a prime example of an
Arrhenius mechanism, but so are other elements of assemblies including interactions
between metal traces within Printed Wiring Boards (PWB's), certain component to board
joints and even solder joints to a certain extent. The other identifiable mechanism is
thermally induced mechanical stress (including fatigue) as between components and the
board and especially solder joints.
Arrhenius Rate Physics:
Contrast the test level of 75°C (shearplate) to 50°C short term worst case transients
during flight and 25°C for the bulk of the mission. Based on Arrhenius reaction rate
physics described and shown on page 6, the 75°C test provides a demonstrated reliability
some 2 to 8 times that of short transients to 50°C, (typical of thermal cycling tests), and
some 4 to 94 times that of long term mission shearplate temperatures (25°C). These
reliability ratios are based on activation energies of 0.3 eV to 1.0 eV which cover most
assembly element reaction physics.
2See "Part Junction Temperature", Practice No. PD-ED-1204
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The Mariner and Viking spacecraft performed a hot dwell test (75°C) of 288 hours
duration. This was reduced to 144 hours for the Voyager and Galileo spacecraft. The
statistical data base supporting this shorter test is unique to the JPL design rules and
processes, therefore the longer hot dwell duration of 288 hours is recommended for
assemblies designed to non-equivalent or less conservative practices.
On page 7 we show the percentage of the screening test capability for Class S parts that
is used by a JPL assembly test at 75°C for 144 hours. A very conservative assumption
here is that all parts in the assembly test have a 35°C temperature rise and that they are
at ll0°C for the entire test. Even given this over-conservative assumption, the JPL test
uses only 0.018% of the class S parts minimum screened capability. Clearly less than
2/10000's of the minimum parts capability being dedicated to the assembly protoflight
test is not a concern. The parts are not over-stressed by this test.
Thermally Induced Mechanical Stress (Fatigue):
JPL has historically done a thermal dwell test rather than a specific thermal cycle test.
There are data that indicate thermal cycling uses up hardware life and therefore is
degrading to the flight hardware. In practice, the JPL test approach is never really just a
one-cycle dwell test. The assembly test program (plus any retest) and the systems test
program (frequently two phases) result in a minimum of two cycles and as many as four
(or more) are possible although they are not continuous and the transients are controlled
to < 30°C/hr to prevent thermal shock. The VGR hardware was tested as follows:
Cycles
Proof Test Assemblies
Qualification
Test
1 Assembly (+ Retest)
2 Systems
3 Cycles (+ Retest)
Flight Assemblies
Acceptance
Test
1 Assembly (+ Retest)
! Systems
2 Cycles (+ Retest)
In a recent JPL study, a fatigue life relationship of equivalent thermal cycles was
determined over different temperature ranges as follows:
PRACTICE NO. PT-TE-1404
PAGE 4 OF 8
THERMAL TEST LEVELS / DURATIONS
try)
where: C 1 is the number of thermal cycles over a T1 range
C_ is the number of thermal cycles over a T 2 range
and Y = 2.6 for eutectic solder.
As a frame of comparison for workmanship purposes, the JPL protoflight test of 1 cycle
over a -20/75°C range can be correlated to an acceptance test of 6 cycles over a 0/50°C
range. In this case:
C1 = 1, T 1 = 95°C,
C 2 = TBD, T 2 = 50°C
and the equivalent cycles of the JPL test are:
C 2 = 1(95°C/50°c)Z6 = 5.3 cycles.
Therefore, in terms of solder joint fatigue life, the JPL protoflight test equivalency to 5.3
cycles over a 50°C range says that, for workmanship acceptance purposes, the JPL
protoflight test is essentially the same as the example thermal cycle acceptance test, i.e.,
5.3 = 6 cycles.
On page 8, a comparison of solder joint fatigue life comparisons has been made. The
recommended -20/+75°C single cycle dwell test uses only 0.14% of the fatigue life of a
solder joint qualified to NHB 5300.4 (3A-l). The point of this comparison is that the
JPL protoflight test is less strenuous to solder joints than thermal cycle testing performed
by most organizations.
Ground Test & Thermally Related Problem/Failure Statistics:
These practices were applied to the Mariner spacecraft series, the two Viking 75
spacecrafts, the two Voyager 77 spacecrafts and more recently the Galileo spacecraft.
These spacecraft all completed (or exceeded) their intended mission successfully (the
Galileo mission is still underway). In fact, the Voyager spacecraft have worked for over
13 years.
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The total number of assembly problems/failures during these missions is small, and the
number of thermally induced problems even smaller. This is shown in the following
table where the number of problem/failures identified during assembly level thermal
testing are compared with suspected flight problems/failures for the Viking, Voyager,
and Galileo programs:
Number of Problem/
Failures Identified during
Assembly Thermal Testing
Number of Known Thermally Induced
Flight Problem Failures
VIKING 251
(2 SPACECRAFT) None Obvious
VOYAGER 123
(2 SPACECRAFT) 1
GALILEO
(1 SPACECRAFT) 50 None to Date
Impact of Non-practice:
Demonstrated design adequacy and its implications to long term reliability are affected.
For example, testing at 50°C instead of 75uC and for about 20 hours instead of 144 hours
reduces test demonstrated reliability by a factor on the order of 50.
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ARRHENIUS REACTION RATE THEORY
k
- e
ko
where:
k
ko
E,
T
To
k
Reaction rate at temperature T (a measure of failures/time)
Reaction rate at reference temperature To
Activation energy, eV
Temperature in degrees Kelvin (°K)
Reference temperature in degrees Kelvin (°K)
Boltzmann's constant (8.617 x 10 .5 eV/°K)
I ocooo
ll0eC Junct| 1.0 eV
G
_. o.3.v
,o
ttl
K
I
80 80 1 O0 12O
JUNCTION TEMPERATURE, "C
(REFERENCE TEMPERATURE . 2$ "C)
20 40 140
ACTIVATION ENERGY (eV) --, 0.3 0.7 1.0
TEST CONDITION
75 °C SHEARPLATE
110 °C JUNCTION
SHORT TERM
FLIGHT TRANSIENT
50 °C SHEARPLATE
85 °C JUNCTION
LONG TERM
FLIGHT CONDITION
25 °C SHEARPLATE
60 °C JUNCTION
TEST CONDITION OVER
SHORT TERM
FLIGHT TRANSIENT
TEST CONDITION OVER
LONG TERM
FLIGHT CONDITION
_31/NC/'.
_25"C
_"JlflCCT.
_'2J"C
_"IUICCT.
_'25"C
13.3
7.1
3.4
1.9
420.2
95.8
17.5
4.4
3.9 24.0
5595.1
676.5
59.6
8.3
93.9
RATIO OF ARRHENIUS FAILURE RATES FOR VARIOUS ACTIVATION
ENERGIES AND PRACTICE CONDITIONS
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SOLDER JOINT FATIGUE LIFE COMPARISON
NHB 5300.4 (3A-l)
PACKAGING
QUALIFICATION TEST
-55°C to 100°C
200 cycles
QUALIFICATION BASELINE
JPL
PROTOFLIGHT
-20°C to 75°C
1 cycle
24 hrs cold
144 hrs hot
EXPOSURE
1 cycle
of
95°C
LIFE EFFECT"
0.14% of
NHB 5300.4(3A-1)
solder joint
, ( 95/2-'(_/" .0014-.:4_
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POWERED-ON VIBRATION
Practice:
Supply power to electronic assemblies during vibration, acoustics and pyroshock and monitor
the electrical functions continuously while the excitation is applied.
Aids in the detection of intermittent or incipient failures in electronic circuitry not otherwise
found. Benefit even for those electronics not powered during launch.
Pro_ams Which Certified Usage:
Mariner series, Viking, Voyager, Magellan, Galileo.
Center to Contact for Information:
JPL
Implementation Method:
Apply service power to electronics assemblies. Monitor as many circuits as possible for
intermittent behavior or change in voltage/current level. Record for later analysis the most
critical electrical functions. Employ instrumentation such as a storage logic analyzer to
monitor relay contacts, especially during pyroshock testing.
Technical Rationale:
NASA and industry practice of powering electronic assemblies during dynamics testing has
proven to be effective in uncovering otherwise undetected "soft" failures. Studies by the
Institute of Environmental Sciences, U.S. military, Tustin Technological Institute, Hobbes
Engineering and others have all arrived at the same general conclusion - power-on vibration
is a valuable tool for exposing latent defects in electronic hardware with the eventual
resultant improvement in product quality.
Intermittencies in electronic circuity can often be detected during
vibration but may not be observed under ambient functional testing.
These intermittencies may not reappear until after launch and in some
cases degenerate into hard failures.
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POWERED-ON VIBRATION
Examples of this include:
Component shorts due to internal conductive particles
Loose or contaminated connectors
Fractured component-to-board solder joints
Electrical arcing
Data number changes in digital equipment
Relay transfer or chatter
Powering of electronic equipment during vibration allows for detection of failures or
intermittent conditions when they occur. This can be extremely useful in diagnosing the
problem and formulating corrective action. In vibration, it is advantageous to know in what
environment, level, axis, and time the anomaly occurred. Also, this procedure allows a test
to be discontinued at the time the anomaly occurs to avoid potential further damage.
Impact of Non-Practice:
Increased probability of flight equipment containing flaws or intermittencies that cause
mission compromises or failures, for example: electrical arcing, open circuits, and relay
chatter.
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Practice:
Subject assemblies and the full-up flight system to swept sinusoidal vibration.
Bene_[:
Certain failures are not normally exposed by random vibration. Sinusoidal vibration permits
greater displacement excitation of the test item in the lower frequencies.
Programs Which Certified Usage:
Mariner Series, Viking, Voyager, Galileo
Center to Contact for Information:
JPL
Implementation Method:
Apply sinusoidal vibration to the test item by sweeping over a frequency range beginning
at = 10 Hz (_+ one octave) up to = 100 Hz (_+ one octave). Sweep the frequency range at
a logarithmic rate (i.e. Af/f is constant). Sinusoidal vibration is performed with the same
fixturing and concurrent with random vibration.
Technical Rationale:
Sinusoidal vibration is employed to simulate the effects of significant flight environment --
launch transients. These transients typically produce the dominant loading on primary and
secondary structure and many of the larger subsystems and assemblies. Sinusoidal vibration
is the only currently widespread method of adequately exciting the lower frequency dynamic
modes - particularly those below _ 40 Hz. Sweeping at a log rate between 1 octave/minute
and 6 octaves/minute should avoid application of excessive fatigue cycles. The higher rate
is near the upper limit which most control systems can accommodate without experiencing
some instability. The use of logarithmic sweep rates has the advantage in that a nearly
equal time is spent at resonance for a given Q, independent of
frequency.
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Sinusoidal vibration levels can be derived as in the following example:
1. Create analytically derived transient waveforms from various flight events:
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2. Compute the shock spectra for each of the waveforms in Step 1:
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.
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Take data from previous flight measurements:
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Combine results from steps 2, and 3 and envelope:
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. Convert to a sine amplitude equivalent vs. frequency by dividing Shock
Response Spectrum envelope in Step 4 by Q:
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Alternatives to the use of swept sine vibration testing are currently under development
which address several of the objections to this method. In particular, the problem of
excessive resonance build-up in a sinusoidal vibration sweep relative to the flight transient
environment may be alleviated by any of the following tests:
Narrow band swept random
Discrete frequency sinusoidal pulses applied at regular
frequency intervals
Complex waveform pulses representative of a composite of the
various launch transient events.
Impact of Non-Practice:
Probability of failure is increased in flight due to low frequency transient environment.
Some workmanship defects in large structures and full-up systems may go undetected.
III. RELIABILITY DESIGN GUIDELINES
A. INTRODUCTION
This section contains Reliability Design Guidelines for consideration by the aerospace
community. The guidelines presented in this section contain information that, in the opinion
of the sponsoring activity, represents a technically credible process that are applied to
ongoing NASA programs/projects. Unlike a Reliability Design Practice, a guideline lacks
specific operational experience or data to indicate that a topic area has contributed to
mission success. However, a guideline does contains information that represents current
"best thinking" on a particular topic.
B. RELIABILITY GUIDELINE FORMAT DEFINITIONS
The format for the reliability guidelines is shown in Figure 2.
GUIDELINE FORMAT DEFINITIONS
Guideline: A brief statement of the guideline.
Benefit: A concise statement of the technical improvement realized from implementing the
guMeline.
Center to Contact for More Information: Source of additional information, usually the
sponsoring NASA, Center. See "CENTER CONTACTS", page iL
Implementation Method: A brie/ technical discussion that is not intended to give the full
details of the process, but rather to provide a design engineer with adequate information to
understand how the guideline shouM be used.
Technical Rationale: A brief technical justification for use of the guideline.
Impact of Nonoractice: A brief statement of what can be expected if use of the guideline is
avoided.
Related Guidelines: Identification of other topic areas in the manual that
contain related information.
Refgl'ences: Publications that contain additional information about the
guideline.
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EARTH ORBIT ENVIRONMENTAL HEATING
Guideline:
Use the currently accepted values for the solar constant, albedo and earth radiation
when calculating the heat balance of earth orbiters. This practice provides the heating
rates for the black body case without consideration of spectral effects or collimation.
Benefit:
Consideration of the solar, albedo, and earth radiation thermal inputs, including seasonal
variation with tolerances, is required to accurately predict the thermal environment of
orbiting devices.
Center to Contact for More Information:
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
lmplement_ti0n Method:
SOLAR CONSTANT
The nominal solar constant value is 1367.5 W/m 2. The variation of the earth-sun
distance causes a _+ 3.5% seasonal variation from nominal. The accuracy of the solar
constant is taken as __ 0.5%. The following are the values for various seasons in the
northern hemisphere.
NOMINAL
WINTER
SUMMER
1367.5 W/m 2
1422.0 W/m z (NOM + 4.0%)
1318.0 W/m z (NOM - 4.0%)
A LBEDO FACTOR*
The nominal albedo factor is 0.30. The variation around the
nominal should be -4-0.05. No variation during the sunlit portion of
a given orbit should be assumed unless extremely light weight items
GODDARD
SPACE FLIGHT
CENTER
*Note: Since earth temperature and albedo vary with latitude, as the orbit approaches
either extreme of a polar or equatorial orbit, further study of the literature should be
made. (see AIAA - 87-1596)
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are being considered. Programs that compute albedo energy should use 0.35 (hot case),
0.30 (nominal case), and 0.25 (cold case), respectively.
EARTH EMITTED ENERGY*
The nominal earth temperature for earth emitted IR energy is 255°K. This temperature
produces a heating rate of 241 W/m 2. A reasonable variation can be obtained by
maintaining consistency using the following relationship between Solar, Albedo, and
Earth Emitted Energy:
Earth Emitted Energy = [(1-Albedo Factor) x Solar Constant] / 4.0
Table 1 shows the variations in Earth Emitted Energy that result from using the above
recommended Solar and Albedo ranges.
Software programs that compute Earth Emitted Energy should use the appropriate hot,
nominal, or cold case Solar and Albedo values; and the corresponding black body Earth
temperature to achieve an energy balance.
REFERENCES FOR QUICK CHECKS OR SIMPLE CALCULATIONS
Hand calculations should be made to verify that computer outputs of heating values for
flat surfaces of known orientation and minimal reflected inputs from other surfaces are
reasonable. Hand calculations also may be necessary when time does not permit a
computer study. A check of incident Albedo energy to a flat plate at various altitudes
and orientations can be made by using TN-D 1842 "Earth Reflected Solar Radiation
Incident Upon an Arbitrary Oriented Spinning Flat Plate," by F. Cunningham. Figures 1
through 9 show the orbit-averaged incident Earth and Albedo energies to an Earth-
oriented flat plate at various altitudes and orbit/sun angles. Eclipse factors for elliptical
orbits are provided in "Calculation of the Eclipse Factor for Elliptical Satellite Orbits",
by F. Cunningham. A hand calculation of incident Earth Emitted Energy to a flat plate
at various attitudes and altitudes also is possible. Figure 10 shows the instantaneous
geometric shape factor for a planar surface as a function of altitude and attitude (h/R is
the ratio of the orbit altitude to the Earth radius). The earth radius is 6,365 km. The
incident Earth Emitted Energy is found by multiplying the shape factor times the black
*Note: Since earth temperature and albedo vary with latitude, as the orbit approaches
either extreme of a polar or equatorial orbit, further study of the literature should be
made. (see AIAA - 87-1596)
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body emissive power at the earth temperature. For an altitude of 1,000 km and a flat
plate whose normal is 90 degrees to the nadir (,_ = 90); h/R = 0.157, which gives a
shape factor of 0.19. The Earth Emitted Energy incident on the plate is 0.19 x 241
W/m 2 or 46 W/m 2.
TABLE 1. VARIATIONS IN EARTH EMITTED ENERGY FOR
RECOMMENDED SOLAR AND ALBEDO RANGES*
SOLAR
CONSTANT
0N/m 2)
NOMINAL 1368
ALBEDO FACTOR EARTH EMITI'ED
ENERGY (W/m 2)
0.25
0.30
0.35
256
239
222
EQUIV. EARTH
TEMP (°K)
258
254
250
WINTER 1422 0.25 267 262
SOLSTICE 0.30 249 258
0.35 231 253
SUMMER 1318 0.25 247 256
SOLSTICE 0.30 231 251
0.35 214 246
* For use in Orbit Average Analyses
NOTE: Since earth temperature and albedo vary with latitude, as the orbit approaches
either extreme of a polar or equatorial orbit, further study of the literature should be
made (see AIAA - 87-1596).
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EQUIVALENT SINK TECHNIQUE
The equivalent sink technique can be used by replacing all surrounding surface radiant
interchanges and the absorbed Solar and Earth energies to node i with a single radiation
coupling to a single node at temperature T sink.
To derive the equation for this sink temperature, first consider an energy balance at
node i where all the inputs are treated as gross inputs and node i has a view to space of
1.0
k
(1) o.._ + o,, + o, ÷ _ 3"A,_o¢. = _et,o_
n=l
From planetary flux
program (TRASYS or SSPTA)
Where:
Qs+a = absorbed solar and albedo energy
Qm = absorbed earth IR energy
Qt = internal power dissipation
o = Stefan-Boltzmann constant
From thermal program (SINDA) results
obtained from Geometric Math Model
(GMM) radiation exchange program
_SrAi_n = Radiant interchange factor
A i = Area of node i
e i = emissivity of node i
Eeli
Next consider the equivalent sink energy balance situation: QI " i _>_/k/k/L@_ 7",
(2)
Solving (1) for Ql and setting equal to the right side of (2) gives:
(3)
¢,A,,,_ = 0,.,
Qs+A
o_=
k
+ Qm + _'_rA,-,, °T_"
n=l
k
+ Qm + __,,_Ai_n oT_.
n=l
The equivalent sink for node i may be determined from the detailed thermal math
model by determining the adiabatic temperature of node i when node i is disconnected
from internal heat paths and heat dissipations. For a transient situation, node i must be
an arithmetic node or a low mass node.
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Technical Rationale:
Thermal analysis of an earth orbiting spacecraft requires the accounting of incident
thermal energy from all external sources. The most significant external sources of energy
incident on the spacecraft are the sun, the thermal radiation of the earth, and the solar
energy reflected from the earth (albedo). The modification of the energy incident on the
spacecraft due to the earth-sun distance variation, and the accuracy of the measurements
of the solar constant, are of sufficient magnitude to be important parameters in
performing a thermal analysis.
Impact of Nonpractice:
Not considering the variations in the environmental thermal effects as described in this
guideline will result in an incomplete thermal analysis. The temperature variation of the
spacecraft could be grossly underestimated, thereby reducing its reliability.
APPENDIX A
Candidate practices and guidelines currently being considered for inclusion in future editions
of this document:
Analytical Procedures
Mechanical component probabilistic design
Mechanical component redundancy
Mechanical component failure prediction using Weibull
Mechanical component nonoperating failure modes
Mechanical component thermal analysis
Weibayes criteria for life extension
Probabilistic methods for inspection of turbine blades
Reliability growth methodology applications to NASA hardware
Risk rating of problem/failure reports
Worst case analysis
Parts stress analysis
Piece part thermal analysis of Electronic assemblies
Internal ESD analysis
Magnetic field characterization
Magnetic dipole placements
Redundancy switching analysis
Structural stress analysis
Power transient analysis
Engineering Design
Shaft design for power systems
For helicopters/aircraft:
a. Gears
b. Bearings
c. Gear boxes
Optimization of turbine blades
Roll rings for high voltage transfer
Orbital fluid systems
NiH batteries
Data Recorders, preferred circuits
Power supplies, preferred circuits
Analog preferred circuits
Digital preferred circuits
Seals and gaskets
Springs
Solenoids
Valve assemblies
Bearings
Gears and splines
Actuators
Pumps
Filters
Brakes/clutches
Compressors
Electric motors
Batteries
Lubrication/friction/wear
Fasteners
Heat pipes
Stresscorrosion cracking - structure/pressurevessels
Assessmentand control of electrical charge
Methodology for extending Shuttle life of life limited items
High permeability materials
Electrical isolation
Designpractices to control ESD
Radiated and Conducted Emissionsdesignrequirements
Magnetic designpractices
Radiated and conductedsusceptibility design requirements
Plasmanoise coupling in EMI design
Environmental Considerations
Environmental effects on photovoltaic arrays
Single event effects on EEE parts due to radiation
Meteoroid/debris strikes
Test Elements
Strain range partitioning
Thermal cycling of photovoltaic arrays
Testing of Photovoltaic cells
a. Air mass 0 (AM0)
b. Charged particle environment
c. Flash
d. Are avoidance
Ultrasonic testing of high voltage PCBs
Accelerated life testing
Fault detection/isolation
Acceptance testing
Reliability verification of surface mount technology circuit assemblies
Reliability testing and demonstration of NASA hardware
Thermal vacuum vs thermal atmospheric testing of electronic assemblies
ESD tests
Assembly and systemlevel vibrations testing
Acoustic tests
Pyroshocktests
Thermal - voltage margin testing
Performance of bearings in high turbo machinery for propulsion systems
Design verification:
a. Radiated emissions
b. Conducted emissions
c. Radiated susceptibility
d. Conducted susceptibility
e. Random vibration
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